For all latest news, follow the Daily Sun's Google News channel.
Indian External Affairs Ministry spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said on September 18 that New Delhi had not been formally informed by Bangladesh about Dhaka’s plan to review 101 agreements and memorandums of understanding signed with India.
He said India would take necessary steps to safeguard its interests.
Earlier, on September 11, government Chief Whip Nurul Islam Moni said the government was reviewing 101 agreements and understandings signed with India during the previous government.
The move is an important indication of a policy reassessment in Dhaka-New Delhi relations.
The geopolitical equation surrounding Bangladesh in 2023 was shaped by US election-related pressure, China’s growing influence and India’s security interests. In 2026, the initiative to review the 101 existing agreements and understandings with India has been added to that equation.
As a result, the need for Bangladesh to simultaneously consider the interests, concerns and competing priorities of Washington, Beijing and New Delhi has become more evident in its foreign policy.
Dhaka wants to pursue relations with all major powers, including the United States, China and India, based on mutual interests and equality, without becoming excessively dependent on any single power, under its “Bangladesh First” policy.
The objective is to expand opportunities for trade, investment, energy, technology, security and development cooperation while safeguarding national interests, sovereignty and strategic autonomy and maintaining continuity in a diversified foreign policy.
The scope of Dhaka-Washington relations has now expanded considerably.
On February 9, 2026, the two countries signed the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade. The agreement provides for reciprocal measures concerning tariffs on goods, market access and trade barriers.
Its preamble links commercial cooperation not only to trade and investment relations but also to national and regional economic security.
As a result, the economy has become an important foundation of the relationship.
This means Bangladesh-US relations can no longer be viewed simply as a continuation of the political pressure seen in 2023. Export markets, tariffs, supply chains, investment, technology and energy are now important components of the relationship.
At the same time, the United States is linking its economic and national security interests with its trade policy. Bangladesh, therefore, needs to consider the political, economic and strategic dimensions of its relations with Washington separately so that one area does not unnecessarily affect another.
Bangladesh’s relations with China have also entered a new phase in 2026.
Prime Minister Tarique Rahman visited China from June 22 to 26. During the visit, he held meetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Qiang.
In a joint statement, the two countries said they had decided to elevate bilateral relations towards building a “China-Bangladesh Community with a Shared Future in the New Era”.
The two sides also discussed a strategic dialogue at the foreign minister level and the possibility of a “two-plus-two” dialogue on diplomacy and defence.
Areas of cooperation with China have also expanded. The two countries have expressed their intention to increase cooperation in trade, investment, industry and supply chains, connectivity, technology, green energy, agriculture, education and human resources.
The joint statement also mentioned the modernisation and expansion of Mongla Port and the development of a Chinese economic and industrial zone in Chattogram.
Possible cooperation on the integrated management and restoration of the Teesta River also came up for discussion.
The two countries also agreed to increase exchanges, visits and training in defence cooperation.
However, deeper ties with China should not be viewed as evidence that Bangladesh is joining any China-centred military or political alliance. Rather, the current policy indicates a tendency to maintain relations with multiple powers.
At the same time, if there is a possibility of long-term dependence in areas such as major infrastructure, loans, ports, technology, energy and defence cooperation, its economic and strategic implications need to be assessed.
When it comes to national interests, the degree of dependence is as important as the depth of relations.
A major reality of Bangladesh’s economic relationship with China is the trade deficit.
During his June visit to China, Prime Minister Tarique Rahman raised the issues of diversifying Bangladesh’s exports to China and reducing the trade deficit. At the same time, he called for faster implementation of infrastructure projects and increased investment.
In other words, Bangladesh’s objective in its relations with China is not merely political closeness; it also seeks tangible economic benefits through higher exports, employment, investment and development projects.
Relations with India are more sensitive.
Following the political change in 2024, tensions emerged in Dhaka-New Delhi relations. Sheikh Hasina’s stay in India and Bangladesh’s demand for her return have remained important issues in bilateral relations.
There are also issues involving the border, trade, connectivity, electricity, security and the sharing of river waters.
Therefore, viewing Bangladesh-India relations merely as an element of US-China rivalry would obscure the bilateral issues and realities specific to the two countries.
The review of 101 agreements and memorandums of understanding has gained particular importance in this context.
Nurul Islam Moni said the government was reviewing all the agreements and would give priority to national interests. He also raised questions about certain arrangements concerning the use of Chattogram and Mongla ports.
However, the government has yet to publish a final list of which agreements will be cancelled, amended or retained. It would therefore be premature to reach any conclusion about the possible outcome of the review.
India’s response has also been cautious so far.
Randhir Jaiswal said New Delhi had not been formally informed about the matter and that India would take necessary steps to safeguard its interests.
There is limited scope to interpret the statement as a direct threat against cancelling the agreements. Rather, it can be viewed as India’s position on safeguarding its bilateral interests.
At the same briefing, Jaiswal said bilateral and technical-level discussions would continue on the Ganges water-sharing treaty.
An important point here is that Bangladesh-India relations are not determined simply by the number of agreements between the two countries.
The nearly 4,000-kilometre border, trade, transport, electricity, security, river water and the livelihoods of people living in border areas are all part of the relationship.
The 30-year term of the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty is also due to expire in December 2026.
Therefore, alongside reviewing the 101 agreements, Dhaka will have to work simultaneously on the future of water sharing, border management and trade relations.
The strategic importance of Bangladesh has increased further because of the India-China rivalry.
China’s possible cooperation in Teesta River management and Bangladesh’s geographical proximity to northeastern India are both relevant to New Delhi.
China, however, has presented the Teesta project as one aimed at Bangladesh’s development and livelihoods.
Therefore, when selecting foreign partners for any project, Dhaka may need to consider not only financing and technology but also the security concerns of neighbouring countries, environmental issues, sovereignty and long-term operating costs.
Bangladesh’s “Bangladesh First” policy can provide a policy framework in this situation.
But implementing the policy effectively requires transparency in decision-making and institutional assessment.
Before signing an agreement with any country, its economic feasibility, loan terms, technological dependence, security risks and future liabilities should be assessed.
Similarly, reviews of existing agreements should apply specific criteria based on law, documents, economic outcomes and national interests rather than political emotion.
Energy security has also become linked to the geopolitical equation.
Bangladesh depends on imports of LNG and other fuels. International market prices, maritime security and disruptions to supply chains can directly affect the country’s power and industrial production.
Increasing energy trade with the United States could provide an alternative source of supply. At the same time, domestic gas exploration, infrastructure development, diversification of suppliers and the creation of strategic reserves are equally important.
Economic security has therefore moved to the centre of foreign policy.
China is a major trading partner of Bangladesh and plays an important role in infrastructure investment. The United States is an important export market and a new trade partner for Bangladesh. India has land and maritime connectivity, electricity, trade and border economies linked with Bangladesh.
The nature of Bangladesh’s relations with these three countries is not the same.
Therefore, instead of assessing all three relationships using the same yardstick, determining national interests on a sector-by-sector basis would be a more effective approach.
The issue of the Mecca defence pact has also broadened Bangladesh’s geopolitical calculations.
It has not yet been decided publicly whether Bangladesh will join a defence framework initiated by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye in the future.
However, if Bangladesh considers participating in such an initiative, its implications would not be limited to relations with the Muslim world. The issue would also have to be considered in the context of Bangladesh’s security and diplomatic calculations with India, the United States, China and its Middle Eastern partners.
Overall, it would be premature to conclude that Bangladesh has become tied to any particular geopolitical bloc.
However, the economic and strategic interests of the United States, China’s growing political and economic cooperation, and India’s security and bilateral interests are all active at the same time.
The review of 101 agreements has made this multidimensional equation more visible.
What happens next will depend on the criteria applied in the review, the transparency of the decisions and subsequent diplomatic negotiations.
The key question for Bangladesh, therefore, is not whether to side with one particular power, but how to assess its relations with each partner separately.
Market and investment opportunities with the United States, infrastructure and trade with China, and neighbourhood relations and connectivity with India all have their own significance.
Protecting national interests does not mean reducing relations with other countries. Rather, it means managing those relations in a way that increases cooperation without unnecessarily restricting Bangladesh’s freedom of decision-making.
“Friendship with all, malice towards none” — Bangladesh’s longstanding foreign policy principle is now facing a more difficult test.
It is impossible to remain completely detached from competition among major powers. At the same time, becoming excessively tied to the strategic calculations of any single power could also create risks.
What is needed, therefore, is a combination of pragmatic diplomacy, strong institutions, transparent agreements, economic calculations and security assessments.
Maintaining this balance will be the key test of Bangladesh’s strategic autonomy.
The writer is a senior journalist.